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Not only constructionism and naturalism are evidently  contradictory,  but  they seem
both perfectly extraneous to Leibniz’s thought. Nevertheless, it is possible to find important
aspects of his thought that expose one or the other, and at times both attitudes. This paper will
examine such aspects, focusing on various doctrines of Leibniz’s that might give hints of such
views (from general epistemology to philosophy of mathematics, from innatism to the theory
of truth), to show that naturalistic and constructionis elements really play a role in Leibniz’s
view of the system of knowledge. This can also be shown to be connected rather with the
richness and variety of his world view, than with an insufficient consistency of his doctrines.
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Leibniz is notoriously an immaterialist philosopher; he is often described as an ‘idealist’
in some sense of the word, and is by his own word a Platonist. On the one hand, nothing in the
world of natural, finite, familiar, ordinary objects is really like it seems: dead matter teems
with microscopic living creatures, that in turn, as corporeal beings, are the phenomenal reflex
of  the unextended,  soul-like elements  of  reality.  On the other  hand,  in  Leibniz’s thought,
mathematical entities and truths are referred to as eternal truths, coextensive with the divine
intellect. Ideally, according to him, every axiom should be demonstrated from the principle of
identity  or  non-contradiction  and  from  definitions  (ideally,  again,  from  real definitions):
natural science is contingent only on some general choice of God’s concerning the laws of the
universe.
Thus not only constructionism and naturalism are evidently contradictory, but they seem
both perfectly extraneous to Leibniz’s ideas.3 Nevertheless, it is possible to find important
aspects of his thought that expose one or the other, and at times both attitudes.
1 Published in Rev. Roum. Philosophie, 61, 1, p. 5–15, 2017.
2 University  of  Turin,  Italy (enrico.pasini@unito.it).  This  paper  was first  presented at  the  Italo-
Romanian Leibniz-Seminar on “Constructionism and Naturalism in Leibniz” held in June 2014 at
the University of Turin.
3 Correspondingly, both themes are quite under-represented in the studies, although constructivism
appears  sporadically.  Let  me  quote  Catherine  Wilson,  “Critical  and  Constructive  Aspects  of
Leibniz’s Monadology”, in The Leibniz Renaissance: International Workshop (Firenze, 2-5 giugno
1986),  Firenze:  Olschki,  1989,  291-303;  Sorin  Costreie,  “Leibniz’s  Constructivism”,  Revue
Roumaine de Philosophie 47 (2003), 67-81.
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Definitely, this does not concern his learning doctrines. When the young Leibniz writes
at § 21 of the Nova methodus docendae discendaeque jurisprudentiae that, since teaching and
learning are concerned with habits, and having natural habits, that we have in common with
other creatures, already been treated, “restat, ut dicamus de causa habitus hominibus propria:
Institutione” (A VI, 1, 277)4, this could smack of constructivism or constructionism. Yet he is
not  so  much  interested  in  the  institution  or  construction  of  concepts,  but  of  efficacious
mnemonic  notes.  Not  ‘construction’,  but  ‘invention’  is  the  key  word  to  his  teaching
philosophy, as it is apparent in the Nova methodus; and to invention, in very classical fashion,
is associated ‘disposition’,  i.e. method itself.  Also when learning methods and instruments
reappear in the more general framework of the ars characteristica and of the encyclopaedia
universalis,  even  in  contexts  where  Leibniz  finds  it  useful  to  enounce  a  “Regula
construendorum  characterum”  (A VI,  4,  182),  no  such  ‘construction’ has  any  smack  of
‘constructionism’.
Some hints of that are present instead in Leibniz’s epistemology of mathematics. In a
mathematical  sense,  constructionism  or  constructivism  asserts  that  it  is  necessary  to
‘construct’ a mathematical object to prove that it exists. Leibniz has a decided preference for
synthetical procedures. Correspondingly, in geometry he privileges construction over analysis
– not practically, nor heuristically, but from an epistemic point of view.5
Leibniz  shares  with  his  mathematical  mentor  Christiaan  Huygens  the  idea  that
construction is “the canonical way of giving (and understanding) a curve”.6 In the line of the
verum factum tradition,  construction provides a  knowledge of the essence of  a  geometric
entity: “Constructio vero est operatio quaedam exacta cujus requisita in potestate sunt, et qua
certum aliquid producitur” (A VI, 4, 315); it is the way things themselves are given (A VI, 4,
317). Construction is epistemologically superior to definition:
4 The abbreviations of Leibniz’s works will follow the style of the Studia Leibnitiana. In particular,
A =  Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe, Darmstadt-Leipzig-Berlin: Akademie der Wissenschaften zu
Berlin, 1923 ff. (series, vol., p.); GM = Leibnizens mathematische Schriften, C. I. Gerhardt ed.,
Berlin-Halle: Asher & Comp., 1849-1863 (vol., p.); GP = Die philosophischen Schriften von G.W.
Leibniz, C.I. Gerhardt ed., Berlin: Weidmann, 1875-90 (vol., p.);  L =  Philosophical Papers and
Letters, Leroy E. Loemker ed., Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1956; DM = Discourse on
Metaphysics;  Mon. =  Monadology;  NE  =  New  Essays  on  Human  Understanding;  Théod.  =
Theodicy. 
5 See H.J.M. Bos “The Concept of Construction and the Representation of Curves in Seventeenth-
Century Mathematics”, in Lectures in the History of Mathematics, Providence, RI: AMS – London
Mathematical  Society,  1993,  23-36.  Bos  starts  from  the  interchanges  between  Leibniz  and
Huygens, to follow the development of the mathematical field of the ‘costruction of equations’ and
its decline. See also Eberhard Knobloch, “Analyticité, équipollence et théorie des courbes chez
Leibniz”, in G.W. Leibniz, Interrelations Between Mathematics and Philosophy, Norma B. Goethe,
Philip Beeley, David Rabouin eds., Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2015, 89-110.
6 Bos, The Concept of Construction, 25.
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On peut definir une Parabole au sens des Geometres, que c’est une figure dans laquelle
tous les rayons paralleles à une certaine droite sont reunis par la reflexion dans un certain
point ou foyer. Mais c’est plutôt l’exterieur, et l’effet qui est exprimé par cette idée ou
definition,  que  l’essence  interne  de  cette  figure,  ou  ce  qui  en  puisse  faire  d’abord
connoitre l’origine.7
Geometers are used to define a parabola as a figure in which parallel rays are brought
together by reflection at the focus. But that definition does not express the essence of the
figure. Just like other kinds of nominal definitions, this indeed ordinary proceeding does not
provide any certainty,  nor enough information,  concerning the possibility of its object;  an
effective constitution of the object would only be given, as it were by a real definition, by the
construction:
On peut même douter au commencement si une telle figure, qu’on souhaite et qui doit
faire cet effet, est quelque chose de possible; et c’est ce qui chez moi fait connoitre, si une
definition est seulement nominale, et  prise des propriétés, ou si  elle est encore réelle.
Cependant celui, qui nomme la Parabole et ne la connoit que par la definition que je viens
de  dire,  ne  laisse  pas  lorsqu’il  en  parle,  d’entendre  une  figure,  qui  a  une  certaine
construction ou constitution, qu’il  ne sait pas, mais qu’il  souhaite d’apprendre pour la
pouvoir tracer.8
In  the  same  way  an  indispensable  constructive  role  is  given,  for  the  case  of  non-
geometrical curves, to tractorial motions in Leibniz’s Supplementum geometriae dimensoriae
seu generalissima omnium tetragonismorum effectio per motum of 1693.9
Conversely, in the Justification du calcul des infinitesimales of 1702 Leibniz supports
the  proposed  foundation  of  his  calculus  with  the  assertion  that  the  ‘errors’ purportedly
introduced by the elision of infinitesimal quantities according to critics like Nieuwentijt and
Rolle, cannot be given by any construction: “si quelqu’un n’en est point content, on peut luy
faire voir à la façon d’Archimede, que l’erreur n’est point assignable et ne peut estre donnée
par aucune construction” (GM IV, 105).
Only construction,  in  the end,  brings  about  the basic  condition of  a  more complete
knowledge of geometric entities, to which in turn physical objects might conform: 
lorsqu’il  s’agit  par  exemple  de  la  figure  d’un  miroir,  qui  ramasse  tous  les  rayons
paralleles dans un point comme foyer, on peut trouver plusieurs proprietez de ce miroir,
avant  que  d’en  connoitre  la  construction,  mais  on  sera  en  incertitude  sur  beaucoup
d’autres affections, qu’il peut avoir, jusqu’à ce qu’on trouve en lui ce qui répond à la
constitution interne des substances, c’est à dire, la construction de cette figure du miroir,
qui sera comme la clef de la connoissance ultérieure.10
7 NE III, 10, § 19; A VI, 6, 346.
8 Ibidem.
9 GM V, 294-301. See again H.J.M. Bos, “Tractional Motion and the Legitimation of Transcendental
Curves”, Centaurus 31 (1988) 9-62; and Pietro Milici, “A Geometrical Constructive Approach to
Infinitesimal Analysis: Epistemological Potential and Boundaries of Tractional Motion”, in From
Logic  to  Practice,  Gabriele  Lolli,  Marco  Panza,  Giorgio  Venturi  eds.,  Cham  (CH):  Springer
Switzerland, 2015, 3-21.
10 NE IV, 6, § 7; A VI, 6, 402.
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The trouble is – and this brings us back to analysis – that “même dans la Geometrie
ordinaire, on n’a pas encore de Methode pour determiner les meilleures constructions, quand
les problèmes sont un peu composés” (NE IV, 3, §7; A VI, 6, 377). So one should resort again
to algebraic and infinitesimal analysis to solve problems; and to analysis situs to prepare the
instruments of a deeper knowledge, that is as much desired by Leibniz as he remembers that
metaphysics was the most desired according to Aristotle:11
rursus deinde necessaria restitutione magnitudinis ad situm, constructionis causa, directe
situs per characteres, et figurarum constructiones per calculum repraesententur, quod inde
non tantum in inventionibus Geometricis, sed et potissimum in applicatione Geometriae
ad physicam maximum fructum promittit.12
It might be mentioned here that from a different standpoint, Samuel Levey13 identifies
“a subtle constructivist strand14 in Leibniz’s philosophical views of mathematics”, which, he
believes,  has  positive  effects,  and  its  drawbacks  too:  it  “leads  him  into  error  in  his
metaphysics of matter, and […] also contributes to the development of his monadism”.15 But
the presupposition of this detection is the opposition between “constructivist  and actualist
philosophies of the infinite”,16 and it is important to remark that in Leibniz, to different kinds
of infinite, correspond different constitutions of the concept. 
Constructionism, from a slightly different point of view, is the doctrine that all or most
of our knowledge is ‘constructed’, in that it is contingent on convention, perception, personal
or social experience. Should this mean that our knowledge does not reflect an external reality,
of course it would not appropriately describe Leibniz’s idea of the world, and this for many
reasons. 
11 “Une telle Métaphysique est  ce qu’Aristote demandoit,  c’est la science qui  s’appelle chez lui,
Ζητουμένη, la desirée, ou qu’il cherchoit” (NE IV, 8, § 9; A VI, 6, 431; with reference to Met., I, 2,
982a4-b10, VII, 1028b2-7); Leibniz mentions the science “desiderata seu quaesita” also in his De
primae philosophiae emendatione of 1694 (GP IV, 468).
12 A VI, 4, 723.
13 Samuel Levey,  “Leibniz’s Constructivism and Infinitely Folded Matter”, in  New Essays on the
Rationalists, Gennaro Rocco, Huenemann Charles eds., Oxford: Oxford U.P. 1999, 134-62.
14 Levey quotes Michael Dummett: “Mathematical objects themselves are mental constructions […]
they  exist  only  in  virtue  of  our  mathematical  activity,  which  consists  in  mental  operations”
(Elements of Intuitionism, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977, 7).
15 Levey, Leibniz’s Constructivism, 134.
16 Levey, Leibniz’s Constructivism, 155.
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First of all, according to Leibniz truth is not ‘constructed’ in any way. In a well-known
Dialogus composed  in  1677  he  confronts  Hobbes’s  theory of  the  truth.  Leibniz  clearly
approves  of  a  truth  theory  that  refers  to  natura  rerum,  the  nature  of  things,  eventually
combined with the knower’s own nature: both natures must be such that, when proceeding by
a valid method, the resulting propositions will be found true.17 But the inevitable expression of
truths  by  means  of  signs  or  characters  might  shed  doubts  on  their  independence  from
arbitrariness:
A. Ergo veritates Arithmeticae aliqua signa seu characteres supponunt? B. Fatendum est.
A.  Ergo  pendent  ab  hominum  arbitrio.  B.  Videris  me  quasi  praestigiis  quibusdam
circumvenire. A. Non mea haec sunt, sed ingeniosi admodum scriptoris.18
According to Hobbes, as his doctrines are depicted there.19 truth arises from names or
characters,  and thus depends on the human will:  truths are propositions expressed by the
means of artificial signs, and so rely on them; such signs are not natural, but arbitrary, and
consequently truths are arbitrary as well. 
According to  Leibniz,  of  course,  truth  is  in  no  way such an arbitrary  construction.
Characters may be arbitrarily formed, but, when used inside propositions, they refer to real
relations between things,  “sine ullo arbitrio nostro” (A VI, 4, 25). This is,  we may say, a
conditioned naturalism:  the  nature  of  things  is  truthful  in  itself,  under  the  proviso of  its
creation by the most perfect being.20
Moreover, although for Leibniz certain notions of ours can be the artificial product of
socially conditioned attitudes, so that he “borders on social constructionism”,21 nevertheless
there  are  ‘naturalistic’ (e.g.  physio-psychological)  explanations  for  such  phenomena.  But,
more important, against constructed fallacies, appropriate counter-constructions can be built,
and this process is based on ‘naturalistic’ remedies, by which the feebleness of human will
can be counterpoised. The most conspicuous example of this attitude of Leibniz’s is a passage
in the Nouveaux essais, where it is told that St. Francisco Borgia, who was given to drinking
heavily when he was a member of high society, had been able to retrench gradually to almost
nothing, by each day letting a drop of wax fall into the flagon which he was accustomed to
drinking dry:
17 “A. Sed quoniam causam esse necesse est cur cogitatio aliqua vera aut falsa futura sit, hanc ubi
quaeso quaeremus? B. In natura rerum puto. A. Quid si ea oriatur ex natura tua. B. Certe non ex
sola. Nam necesse est et meam et rerum de quibus cogito, naturam talem esse, ut quando methodo
legitima  procedo  propositionem  de  qua  agitur  concludam  seu  veram  reperiam.  A.  Pulchre
respondes” (A VI, 4, 21-22). See L, 183. Nevertheless, certain men of learning believe that truths
originate “ab arbitrio humano, et ex nominibus seu characteribus” (A VI, 4, 22).
18 A VI, 4, 22-23.
19 For a modern point of view, see Donald W. Hanson, “Reconsidering Hobbes’s Conventionalism”,
The  Review  of  Politics 53  (1991),  627-651;  Ioli  Patellis,  “Hobbes  on  Explanation  and
Understanding”, Journal of the History of Ideas 62 (2001), 445-462.
20 Indeed, it is in the margin of this writing that Leibniz inscribes his famous “Cum Deus calculat et
cogitationem exercet fit mundus” (A VI, 4, 22).
21 Justin E.H. Smith,  Divine Machines: Leibniz and the Sciences of Life, Princeton: Princeton U.P.,
2011, 38.
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François de Borgia General des Jesuites qui a esté enfin canonisé, estant accoutumé à
boire largement, lorsqu’il estoit homme du grand monde; se réduisit peu à peu au petit
pied, lorsqu’il pensa à la retraite, en faisant tomber chaque jour une goutte de cire dans le
bocal  qu’il  avoit  accoustumé  de  vuider.  […]  En  un  mot  il  faut  profiter  des  bons
mouvemens comme de la voix de Dieu qui nous appelle, pour prendre des resolutions
efficaces.22
The world as it is given to our experience seems often to have for Leibniz, in spite of his
metaphysics, a reality of its own. Clearly what is given is not automatically ‘natural’; in fact,
in Leibniz’s perspective, what is properly given is the common representation, according to
each substance’s point of view and law of independent development, of the universe that is
shared by all creatures, thanks to the pre-established harmony of their spontanities:
une  meditation  plus  profonde  nous  apprend,  que  tout  (même  les  perceptions  et  les
passions) nous vient de nostre propre fonds, avec une pleine spontaneité.23
This affords us the possibility to say that, under Leibnizian premises, even the most
constructed among our ideas would come to us in a natural way: 
nous ne formons pas nos idées, parce que nous le voulons; elles se forment en nous, elles
se  forment  par  nous,  non pas  en consequence de nostre  volonté,  mais  suivant  nostre
nature et celle des choses […] c’est par la preformation divine qu[e l’âme] produit ces
belles idées, où nostre volonté n’a point de part, et où nostre art ne sauroit atteindre.24
If our faculties were a camera obscura, then, as Leibniz writes in the Nouveaux essays,
“il faudrait supposer que dans la chambre obscure il y eut une toile pour recevoir les especes,
qui ne fut pas unie, mais diversifiée par des plis représentant les connoissances innées”; this
represents metaphorically the innate components of human cognitive nature.  Connected to
this  ability  to  condition  receptivity  and  add  to  it  some innate  ingredient,  there  is  also  a
productive ability: “que de plus cette toile ou membrane étant tendue, eût une maniere de
ressort  ou force d’agir,  et  même une action ou reaction accommodée tant aux plis  passés
qu’aux nouveaux venus des impressions des especes” (NE II, 12, § 17; A VI, 6, 144). It is a
kind of innatism that Leibniz himself famously qualified as ‘virtual’, being based on ‘natural
virtualities’:
22 NE II, 21,  35; A VI, 6, 187; see  New Essays on Human Understanding, P. Remnant, J. Bennett
eds., Cambridge, MA: Cambridge U.P., 1996, 187. 
23 Théod., § 296; GP VI, 292.
24 Ibidem. Moreover, there is some ineliminable correspondence between nature and the ideas that
come to us naturally, that brings Leibniz to quite contorted formulations: “la Nature peut fournir
des idées plus parfaites et plus commodes, mais elle ne donnera point un dementi à celles que nous
avons, qui sont bonnes et naturelles, quoi que ce ne soyent peut etre pas les meilleures et les plus
naturelles” (NE III, 6, § 30; A VI 6, 323).
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les idées et les vérités nous sont innées, comme des inclinations, des dispositions, des
habitudes  ou  des  virtualités naturelles,  et  non  pas  comme des  actions;  quoyque  ces
virtualitez soyent tousjours accompagnées de quelques actions souvent insensibles, qui y
repondent.25
The  most  important  domain  in  which  Leibniz  deploys  this  kind  of  innatist
constructionism is his theory of the role of common sense, or internal sense: a faculty of the
soul that coincides, in the Aristotelian tradition of psychology, with imagination and shows a
crucial role, in certain writings of Leibniz’s, in building our image of the phenomenal world.
The internal sense plays to some extent the role of a channel through which infinitesimal
environmental perceptions are collected and organized, where the sentiment of phenomenal
reality takes its form and a representation of macroscopic objects is structured, that is then
offered both to knowledge and to practice.26
The internal sense is responsible for the production of mathematical notions, thanks to
that kind of innate disposition to produce general categories on the occasion of experience, to
which Kant is so hostile.27 It provides, by means of innate mechanisms that are part of our
nature, the composition of colors, like “les idées du bleu et du jaune dans notre idée sensitive
du verd” (NE IV, 6, § 7; A VI, 6, 403), as well as the appearance of continuity and solidity that
characterizes our perceptual world, in which we do not distinguish the conspiring movements
of the microscopic living components of any apparently un-living thing, with an effect similar
to that of the artificial perception of a continuous transparency: 
la perception d’un transparent artificiel que j’ai remarqué chez les horlogers, fait par la
promte rotation d’une roue dentelée; ce qui en fait disparaître les dens, et paroitre à leur
place un transparent continuel imaginaire composé des apparences successives des dents
et  de  leur  intervalles,  mais où la  succession est  si  promte que notre  phantaisie  ne la
sauroit distinguer.28
25 NE, Préf.; A VI, 6, 52. Italic is mine.
26 See my old  Corpo e funzioni  cognitive in Leibniz,  Milano:  Franco Angeli,  1996;  “Perception,
Imagination and Leibniz’s Theory of Will”, in  Leibniz und Europa, VI. Internationaler Leibniz-
Kongreß. Vorträge, Hannover: Leibniz-Gesellschaft, 1994, 581-88.
27 See Kant’s treatment of the Präformationssystem der reinen Vernunft in A 128-29.
28 NE IV, 6, § 7; A VI, 6, 403.
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Correspondently, eternal truths such as mathematical laws, in accordance with which
the phenomena of nature are structured (GP IV, 292), are embedded in nature; this is what
Leibniz has in mind, when he maintains that the truly sufficient criterion for distinguishing
real from imaginary phenomena is the success of predicting future phenomena from past and
present ones: “potissimum realitatis phaenomenorum indicium quod vel solum sufficit,  est
successus praedicendi phaenomena futura ex praeteritis et praesentibus”.29
The fact that insentient nature (although in the end, as it is well known, for Leibniz there
is  no  insentient  nature,  but  macroscopic  inanimate  objects  are  aggregates  of  innumerable
microscopic living beings) is so entwined with eternal truths, also allows, by the way, for
precise  execution  of  complex  processes  even  at  the  level  of  macroscopic,  mechanically
behaving objects: 
Quelle necessité y a-t-il qu’on sache tousjours comment se fait ce qu’on fait? Les sels, les
metaux, les plantes, les animaux, et mille autres corps animés ou inanimés, savent ils
comment se fait ce qu’ils font, et ont ils besoin de le savoir? Faut il qu’une goutte d’huyle
ou de graisse entende la Geometrie, pour s’arrondir sur la surface de l’eau?30
In  connection  to  this,  we  might  consider  yet  another  aspect  of  our  subject.  In  the
Bachelardian sense of ‘construction’ – a very representative one – the act of expressing a
(scientific) question defines, i.e. ‘constructs’ the object of inquiry prior to any knowledge of
it: “Pour un esprit scientifique, toute connaissance est une réponse à une question. S’il n’y a
pas eu de question, il ne peut y avoir connaissance scientifique. Rien ne va de soi. Rien n’est
donné. Tout est construit”31.
Leibniz’s point of view is at the same time comparable to such positions, and radically
different. According to him, our image of the world depends on a variety of circumstances:
through technology we can even fabricate for ourselves new organs of perception,  e.g. “en
nous formant des Microscopes” (NE II, 23, § 13; A VI, 6, 220). And to him it is perfectly
obvious that we construct theoretical entities, and that such entities are not represented as such
in nature. This enables theories so opposite, in principle, as the actually infinite division of the
continuous, and atomism, to work both, and work well, although – what’s more – both be
contrary to reason, in particular to what Leibniz often calls the metaphysical reasons of the
laws of nature. 
This is especially enlightened by a passage of the famous letter to Varignon of 1702,
where Leibniz suggests that, on the one hand, natural processes can be studied by considering
infinitesimals  as  if  they  were  perfect  realities:  “on peut  dire  de  même que  les  infinis  et
infiniment petits sont tellement fondés que tout se fait dans la géométrie, et même dans la
nature, comme si c’étaient de parfaites réalités” (GM IV, 93); while, on the other hand, it is
perfectly possible to institute an atomistic science of nature:
29 A VI, 4,  1501;  “ego satis  reale dicerem, si  ratione bene utentes nunquam ab eo deciperemur”
(1502). See also L, 363-66. 
30 Théod., § 403; GP VI, 357.
31 Gaston Bachelard, La formation de l’esprit scientifique, Paris: Vrin 1934, 14. “If there has been no
question,  there  can  be  no  scientific  knowledge.  Nothing  is  self-evident.  Nothing  is  given.
Everything  is  constructed”  (The  Formation  of  the  Scientific  Mind,  M.  McAllester  Jones  ed.,
Manchester: Clinamen Press, 2000, 25).
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Cependant on peut dire en général que toute la continuité est une chose idéale et qu’il n’y
a  jamais  rien  dans  la  nature  qui  ait  des  parties  parfaitement  uniformes,  mais  en
récompense le réel ne laisse pas de se gouverner par l’idéal et l’abstrait et il se trouve que
les règles du fini réussissent dans l’infini comme s’il y avait des atomes (c’est-à-dire des
éléments assignables de la nature) quoiqu’il n’y en ait point, la matière étant actuellement
sous-divisée sans  fin;  et  que  vice  versa les  règles  de l’infini  réussissent  dans le  fini,
comme s’il y avait des infiniment petits métaphysiques, quoiqu’il n’y en ait pas besoin; et
que la division de la matière ne parvienne jamais à des parcelles infiniment petites.32
32 GM IV, 93-94.
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The specifically Leibnizian reason for this is that the real is effectively governed by, as
he words it, ‘the ideal and the abstract’. In fact one can admit infinitesimals as “ideal concepts
(notions ideales) which shorten our reasoning, similar to what we call imaginary roots in the
ordinary algebra,  for example,  √-2”33.  The rules  of  the finite  are  found to succeed in  the
infinite, and conversely the rules of the finite succeed in the infinite, because everything is
governed by reason; and this is guaranteed, plainly, by natural theology: in fact, if it were
otherwise, the creation would not conform with the nature of the sovereign principle.
Also for  the just  mentioned imaginary  numbers,  or  imaginary roots,  in  the  end the
‘nature  of  things’ provides  a  foundation:  according  to  Leibniz,  in  his  Specimen  novum
analyseos pro scientia infiniti (GM V, 350-61), nature, grounded as it is in the divine mind, is
so devoted to variety, that it could not do without that ‘wonder of analysis’, that portent of the,
again, ideal world:
Verum enim vero  tenacior  est  varietatis  suae  pulcherrimae  Natura  rerum,  aeternarum
varietatum parens, vel potius Divina Mens, quam ut omnia sub unum genus compingi
patiatur. Itaque elegans et mirabile effugium reperit in illo Analyseos miraculo, idealis
mundi  monstro,  pene  inter  Ens  et  non-Ens  Amphibio,  quod  radicem  imaginariam
appellamus.34
Epistemological  constructivism  is  thus  just  the  other  side  of  Leibniz’s  particular
naturalism.  Leibniz  thought  to  live  in  a  two-sided  world,  in  which  there  is  perfect
correspondence between mechanical phenomena and the reality of unextended, non-material
individual substances, as there is between two perfectly symmetrical faces of the same coin:
L’operation des Automates spirituels, c’est à dire des Ames, n’est point mecanique, mais
elle  contient  eminemment  ce  qu’il  y  a  de  beau  dans  la  mecanique:  les  mouvemens,
developpés  dans  les  corps,  y  étant  concentrés  par  la  representation,  comme dans  un
monde idéal, qui exprime les loix du monde actuel et leur suites, avec cette difference du
monde idéal parfait qui est en Dieu, que la pluspart des perceptions dans les autres ne sont
que confuses.35
33 GM  IV,  92;  translation  of  this  passage  and  my overall  paraphrase  follow L,  543-44;  for  an
analogous train of thoughts in 1698 see Leibniz’s letter to Johann Bernoulli in June of that year
(GM III, 499-500). See my Il reale e l’immaginario. La fondazione del calcolo infinitesimale nel
pensiero di Leibniz, Torino, Sonda, 1993; Douglas M. Jesseph, “Leibniz on the Foundations of the
Calculus: The Question of the Reality of Infinitesimal Magnitudes”,  Perspectives on Science 6
(1998), 6-40;  Infinitesimal Differences: Controversies Between Leibniz and His Contemporaries,
Ursula Goldenbaum, Douglas M. Jesseph eds., Berlin: de Gruyter, 2008.
34 GM V, 357.
35 Théod.,  § 403; GP VI, 357. Were not for this duplication of activity and passivity, “elle fût un
Dieu” (358).
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But the two sides, like in Moebius strings, are just one and the same – and the realist
view can be reduced to the immaterialist one. Materialism is indeed rejected by Leibniz (since
it eliminates spiritual beings), mainly using arguments against the existence of matter as such.
Nevertheless, ‘naturalism’, if we consider it as the idea that the phenomena studied by the
natural sciences exhaust reality, is accepted by Leibniz as a partial but correct representation
of the created universe. Even ‘physicalism’, according to which the phenomena studied by
physics exhaust reality, would also be true in his view, as far as in his opinion everything
occurs mechanically in bodies, while everything is to be explained in vital terms in respect to
souls: 
omnia in corporibus fieri mechanice, id est per intelligibiles corporum qualitates nempe
magnitudines figuras et motus; et omnia in animabus esse explicanda vitaliter, id est per
intelligibiles qualitates animae nempe perceptiones et appetitus.36
Leibniz’s conception of macroscopic reality is physicalist precisely in this sense, that
physical  causes  and  mechanistic  interactions  exhaust  explanations;  but  the  principles  of
mechanism are  metaphysical.37 Thus  Leibniz’s  naturalism does  not  deny  the  existence  of
supernatural realities. On the contrary, natural phenomena, like the laws of motion insofar as
they are explained by Leibniz’s new concept of force,  show that they do exist:  dynamics
makes allowance for infinite unextended, non-material, spiritual centers of force, of which we
have but an indirect knowledge through natural means. And ‘infinite’ and ‘force’, in fact, are
two-sided concepts, or properties, with both a physical and a metaphysical import. 
In  Leibniz’s  immaterialist  physicalism,  living  creatures  are  a  middle  term between
macroscopic,  mechanistic reality and purely immaterialist  metaphysics; they play the role,
scientifically and metaphysically, of intermediate entities, being, at the same time, ‘natural
machines’ and ‘composite substances’. Actually, the living is composed of albeit peculiar and
infinitely complicated animated machines.38
As a scientist, Leibniz wore mechanicist naturalism as it were a reversible jacket, on the
other  side  of  which  immaterialism  did  lure.  Various  theoretic  constructions  are  able  to
describe that mechanist ‘reality’; but in Leibniz’s view dynamics, and the observation of ‘live
forces’, push the scientist for turning the jacket inside out, and find, on the reverse of natural
phenomena, the everlasting fashion of metaphysical, absolute reality. By these insuperable
bounds Leibniz limits his own constructionism, and naturalism, of which otherwise he makes
easily use in both empirical and theoretic science, and that he even combines together – which
should be no surprise, since syntheses of incompatible views characterize more than anything
Leibniz’s thought.
36 G.W.  Leibniz,  Opuscules, ed. by Louis Couturat, Paris: Alcan, 1903, 12; see also  Philosophical
Writings, G.H.R. Parkinson ed., London: Dent, 1973, 173.
37 GP VII, 344; see  Philosophical Essays, Roger Ariew, Daniel Garber eds., Indianapolis: Hackett,
1989, 319.
38 This theme, as well as that of the correspondence between nature and reason, realm of nature and
realm of grace, efficient and final causes, that I have referred to above, is much worked on in
Leibniz-Forschung. I cannot go more in deep here, and even a succinct bibliography would require
much space. 
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